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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THELMA KOER, 1 
Plaintiff and Appellant, I 
vs. f Case No. 
MAYFAIR MARKETS, dba GRAND ) 10630 
AMERICAN MARKETS, nka AR- I 
DEN FARMS, CO., 1 
Defendant and Respondent I 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by Appellant, Thelma 
Koer, to recover damages for personal injuries which she 
suffered as a result of slipping on the premises owned and 
operated by the Respondent. 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE LOWER COURT 
At the close of the evidence offered by the Appellant, 
the Respondent made a Motion for a Directed Verdict in 
its favor and against Appellant upon the grounds that Ap-
pellant, as a matter of law, had not established any liability 
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on the part of Respondent. The Court took the Motion un-
der advisement and Respondent then presented its evidence, 
after which it renewed its Motion for a Directed Verdict. 
The Court did not rule on either Motion at that time, as the 
Judge followed the procedure of holding the motion under 
advisement and submitting special interrogatories to the 
jury. The jury answered the interrogatories (R. 74), sub-
stantially in favor of Appellant, and thereafter, arguments 
were made by counsel for both parties on Respondent's Mo-
tion for a Directed Verdict. The Court granted the motion 
and entered a judgment of dismissal in favor of Respondent 
(R. 75-76). 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
While primarily the Appellant on this appeal seeks to 
reverse the order of the Court in directing a verdict for the 
defendant she goes further and contends that a judgment 
should be entered in accordance with the findings of the 
jury. She also asks for a construction of Sections 22-7-3 
and 21-7-4, U. C. A. 1953. Respondent opposes the reversal 
requested by the Appellant and moves to strike the other 
requested reliefs for the reason that they are irrelevant and 
immaterial on this Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent does not concur with the Statement of 
Facts as submitted by the Appellant and therefore, sets 
forth those which it considers of importance to the sole 
issue herein involved. However, by way of preface, Re-
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spondent mentions that much of the information submitted 
in the twenty-three pages of statements made by Appellant 
under the title "Statement of Facts" include conclusions of 
an argumentative nature, which are of no materiality. In-
ter alia these include counsel's opinion that the store mana-
ger, Harold Ross, had constructive notice of the presence 
of the substance and failed to remove it; that he walked by 
the spot while it lay on the floor; that it was there for him 
to see; and, that he failed to observe it. Furthermore, the 
statement of evidence on damages is irrelevant as that issue 
has not been raised and is not before the Court. 
In order to screen the evidentiary wheat from the 
chaff, we state these facts as being those which cast light 
on the issue to be resolved. On October 22, 1965, Appellant 
entered Respondent's store located at 3400 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, for the purpose of purchasing 
either hamburger or ground beef (R. 197). As she turned 
a corner of an aisle leading into the meat section of the 
store, she slipped and fell to the floor near a delicatessen 
stand (R. 201). Her location at the time of the fall is 
shown on Exhibit D-2 near the "Chief's Pride" display case, 
and on Exhibit D-10 by a black mark (R. 187). According 
to her testimony, she stepped on a slippery substance and 
this caused her fall (R. 202). However, she stated that 
prior to the fall the floor appeared clean and she saw no 
water, paper, debris, produce, or foreign matter on the 
floor (R. 240-241). 
Immediately after the incident, Appellant was taken 
to the office of the manager, who was then at the check-
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stand (R. 203). It was a short time thereafter that he 
returned to the office to see the Appellant (R. 203). After 
some discussion with her, the manager went to the area 
where the place of fall was pointed out and he observed a 
wet slide mark with a small substance at the end of the 
marking. He concluded the foreign matter was a crushed 
piece of grape (R. 169). 
On the morning of the fall, the floor was cleaned by 
Allred Floor Maintenance, a company specializing in that 
sort of work (R. 260-263). An extensive procedure was 
followed, which required four to four and one-half hours 
time to complete (R. 264). After a thorough cleaning, a 
slip resistant wax was used (R. 265) to cover the floor 
materials and the work was completed between 8:00 and 
9:00 a.m. on October 22, 1964 (R. 264). 
The Respondent's manager arrived at work at 8:00 
a.m. on October 22, 1964, at which time he checked the 
store to see if the cleaners "had the store in good shape" 
(R. 189). On that morning, he and a butcher worked in 
in the aisle where Appellant fell and this was within the 
area he had checked for cleanliness (R. 189). While the 
manager left to perform other tasks, the butcher worked in 
that aisle most of the morning (R. 190) but he was not 
handling produce. Prior to the fall, employees working in 
the store had not received any information from any source 
that there was any produce on the floor (R. 188) nor is 
there any evidence that they had observed any such condi-
tion. Before the accident, the manager had been called 
from his office to the cashiers' checkstands (R. 164), which 
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required him to pass between the ends of two meat coun-
ters and change direction into the aisle where the fall oc-
curred. This aisle was twelve feet wide and after travers-
ing it part way, the manager turned east to the check-
stands (R. 165, Ex. D-2). During the walk from his office 
to the checkstands, the manager did not see any foreign 
object or matter on the floor (R. 165). 
According to the manager at the time he was notified 
of the Appellant's fall, he was standing near the fifth 
checkstand (R. 164). He estimated that the time elapsing 
between the time he left his office until he was advised a 
lady had fallen, was two or three minutes (R. 166, 167). 
After receiving the report of the fall, the manager then 
looked for the Appellant and located her in the office (R. 
168). Another store employee, estimated that it could have 
been ten to fifteen minutes from the time she was made 
aware of the incident until the manager returned to his 
office (R. 155). 
The area where the Appellant fell was 88 feet from 
the produce area (R. 175). There were no items on display 
in the immediate area of the place of the fall that remotely 
resembled the substance which was found on the floor by 
the store manager (R. 188). The record is silent as to 
how long the object had been on the floor, how it came to 
be there, or who was responsible for it being on the floor. 
Its presence was undiscovered and unknown until after 
the fall. There were many people at the checkstands just 
before and at the time of Appellant's accident and there 
had been customers shopping in the aisle where the fall 
occurred immediately prior thereto (R. 184). 
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ARGUMENT 
Respondent does not argue Points IV and V raised by-
Appellant for as previously stated, in the setting of this 
case, they are merely surplusage. Furthermore, Appellant's 
Points I, II and III are consolidated for arguing under one 
point because counsel for Respondent submit that there is 
only one question raised by this appeal, namely, the pro-
priety of the ruling of the trial court in directing a verdict 
in favor of Respondent. 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DI-
RECTING A VERDICT FOR THE RESPON-
DENT. 
Respondent divides and argues this point in two parts, 
namely, that it was not negligent for the reason (a) it had 
no actual knowledge of the foreign substance on the floor, 
and (b) the evidence, as a matter of law, does not present 
facts from which a jury could charge Respondent with 
knowledge of the presence of any slippery matter on the 
floor. 
We accept the proposition that Appellant brings her-
self within the sweep of the language in Hay ward V. Doivn-
ing, 112 Utah 508, 189 P. 2d 442, which defines the status 
of a third person on the property of the owner for shopping 
purposes. In that case, the Court stated: 
"An 'invitee' is ordinarily one who goes upon 
the premises of the owner or occupant for the pur-
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pose of transacting business or for the mutual bene-
fit of each of them or for the benefit of the occu-
pant, and he may expressly invited to come upon 
the premises, but more commonly his invitation is 
implied." 
With that as a starting point, we look to the authori-
ties to determine the duty imposed on the owner of prop-
erty to protect an invitee from injury. Restatement of the 
Law, Torts, Second, §343 provides: 
"§343. Dangerous Conditions known to or Discov-
erable by Possessor — 
A possessor of land is subject to liability 
for physical harm caused to his invitees by a con-
dition on the land if, but only if, he 
(a) knows or by the exercise of reason-
able care would discover the condition, and 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable 
risk of harm to such invitees, and 
(b) should expect that they will not dis-
cover or realize the danger, or will fail to pro-
tect themselves against it, and 
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to 
protect them against the danger." 
An earlier version of this rule was cited with author-
ity in Erickson V. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 31, 232 P. 
2d 210 (1951), and the principles therein stated are appo-
site here. 
In the case of Hampton v. Rowley, 10 Utah 2d 169, 350 
P. 2d 151 (1960), the Court was faced with a state of facts 
which established that a small rock was on a step leading 
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from defendant's building. As the plaintiff was leaving 
with the merchandise he had purchased, he stepped on the 
rock and slipped, causing him certain personal injuries. 
The error complained of on appeal was that the Court erred 
in instructing the jury that the defendants could not be 
held unless they either knew, or in the exercise of ordinary 
care, should have known, that the rock was on the step. 
A verdict in favor of the defendant was affirmed and 
this is the language used by the Court: 
"In regard to a transitory condition of the char-
acter here involved, the instruction given is con-
sistent with well established law that in order to 
find the defendants negligent it must be shown that 
they either knew, or in the exercise of reasonable 
care should have known, of any hazardous condition 
and had a reasonable opportunity to remedy the 
same. Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 
284 P. 2d 477; Lucas v. City of Juneau, D. C, 168 
F. Supp. 195, 198." 
When the principles of the foregoing authorities are 
applied to the facts in this instance, it is apparent that in 
order for Appellant to establish liability, she must come 
forward with evidence from which reasonable men could 
reach one of two conclusions. First, that agents or employ-
ees of the Respondent had actual knowledge that there was 
a foreign article on the floor which would make it unsafe 
for shoppers. Second, that by exercising ordinary care, 
employees of the Respondent would discover the condition. 
If either of those conclusions are supported by the evidence, 
then the Appellant must further show that employees of 
the Respondent should expect that Appellant would not dis-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cover the presence of the article and realize its danger. 
While the Hampton case deals with an instruction to a 
jury, the principle announced should be dispositive of the 
case at bar for here there is no evidence from which a jury 
could find that the Respondent knew or in the exercise of 
ordinary care should have known that an object as transi-
tory as a grape was on the floor. 
A case decided by the Supreme Court of New Mexico 
has much in common with this case and we commend it to 
the Court's attention. In Jimez V. Shop Rite Foods, Inc., 
72 N. M. 184, 382 P. 2d 181 (1963), plaintiff was seeking 
damages for injuries resulting from a fall in defendant's 
store when she slipped on a grape which was on the floor 
in the produce department. The verdict was for the plain-
tiff and the trial court granted defendant's motion for a 
judgment N. 0. V. The appellate court affirmed, stating 
this interesting concept: 
"We also stated that each case must be con-
sidered on its facts, and pointed out specifically that 
it was not intended thereby to establish a rule re-
quiring a storekeeper to 'follow each customer about 
his store, dustpan in hand, to gather up debris.' To 
conclude that in the instant case the trial court had 
erred would certainly amount to a holding in effect 
that this is exactly what is required." 
The court, in the last cited case, determined that in 
light of the facts therein stated, there was sufficient evi-
dence of defendant's negligence and lack of due care to sup-
port a jury finding. For obvious reasons, the facts of this 
case are more compelling in favor of the store owner than 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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were those quoted in the cited case because this grape was 
far removed from the place where produce was displayed 
for sale. A grocer might anticipate produce falling on the 
floor near the place of display, but not in an area far re-
moved therefrom and where other foods are stored. 
The trial judge in ruling on the motion in the case at 
bar considered and analyzed the doctrine announced in 
Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Co., 3 Utah 2d 364, 284 P. 2d 477 
and Campbell v. Safetvay Stores, Incorporated, 15 Utah 2d 
113, 388 P. 2d 409. He arrived at the conclusion that the 
former announced the principles controlling in this case and 
counsel for Respondent are convinced he decided the issues 
rightly and that his holding will be supported by this Court: 
This is the rationale of Lindsay: 
"Plaintiff, after dining in defendant's coffee 
shop, slipped in a small quantity of water which 
somehow got on the floor some time after she was 
seated. Although the evidence indicated that a 
waitress delivered water in glasses to plaintiff and 
her companion, there is no evidence as to whether 
the waitress, the plaintiff, her companion, other 
patrons or persons spilled the water on the floor, 
or exactly when it was spilled, or whether the man-
agement knew of its existence. In other words, 
there was no evidence as to how the water got onto 
the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when 
it arrived there or that the defendant had knowl-
edge of its presence. Under such circumstances, a 
jury cannot be permitted to speculate that the de-
fendant was negligent. A reading of plaintiff's 
authority makes obvious the factual difference be-
tween that case and its inapplicability to the one 
here." (Emphasis added.) 
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In the later case of Campbell, the Court distinguished 
Lindsay and this was the yardstick used for differentiation: 
"A more crucial question is whether the evi-
dence will justify a finding that the defendant's 
servants placed the box there. Defendant is war-
ranted in insisting that this fact cannot be found 
from speculation and conjecture, but there must be 
a sound basis in the evidence from which it can 
reasonably be determined that there is a greater 
probability that the box was left there by an em-
ployee than otherwise. Facts shown by the evidence 
which might be regarded as having a significant 
bearing on that question are these: that this was 
quite a small box; only six inches high, by one foot 
wide and a foot and a half long; that it was of a 
type which some of the canned goods come in which 
the clerks remove and place on the shelves; that it 
would be quite unusual for a customer to be using 
a cardboard box in the merchandise area; and even 
more so to be using one of this small size; that cus-
tomers usually do not do so, but use shopping carts 
for gathering their purchases, then go through the 
checkstands; that the checkers place the items pur-
chased in large sacks, or in some instances in boxes; 
if boxes are used for this purpose, they are usually 
larger than the box referred to. From these facts, 
and inferences that can be drawn from them, the 
jury could reasonably believe that there was a 
greater probability that store employees left the 
box where it was than that a customer or stranger 
did. This case is distinguishable from Lindsay v. 
Eccles Hotel. There the plaintiff slipped on water 
spilled on the floor of a cafe. Both employees and 
customers had access to the water, so it would have 
involved mere conjecture as to who spilled it." 
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In the case at bar, the formulae used in Lindsay fits 
precisely. Here both customers and employees had access 
to the grapes. There is no evidence as to whether a custo-
mer or an employee was responsible for the position of the 
grape, how it got to its place of crushing, how far it might 
have rolled, if it did, or that defendant had knowledge of 
its presence. If we deal in probabilities — which was the 
essence of the decision in Campbell — then they favor the 
Respondent. The produce counter was some 88 feet away 
from where the slipping occurred and there would have 
been no occasion for an employee to be placing grapes on 
display in that area or carrying them over a route passing 
the place of fall. In addition, it is much more likely that 
some customer selected a bunch of grapes, was transporting 
them in the usual four wheeled basket while searching for 
other merchandise and that one jarred loose and fell on the 
floor. In Campbell, the Court pointed out that cartons are 
used by employees of the store to transport canned goods 
from a storage area to display shelves; they are left in 
aisles for short periods of time; and, customers seldom cart 
cartons around the store. Here the pendulum swings the 
other direction for customers move produce in the baskets, 
the size of the mesh permits small articles to fall through 
the bottom of the carrier and there had been considerable 
traffic in the aisle immediately preceeding the fall. Con-
trary to Campbell, in this case, it is most improbable that 
the article crushed by Appellant's shoe was dropped by an 
employee. In addition, the size and color of the object was 
such that it would be difficult to observe and this militates 
against any finding that by the exercise of reasonable care 
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the Respondent would have known its position. For aught 
that appears in this case, the grape could have rolled or 
dropped to the position just before plaintiff arrived. Merely 
because it was flattened after being crushed by Appellant's 
weight does not compel a holding it was not round and 
fleeting prior thereto. 
Certainly Appellant's contention that the Respondent 
was negligent because of the presence of the foreign sub-
stance on the floor cannot be supported by the prior deci-
sions of this Court. Furthermore, the following cases from 
other jurisdictions state cogent concepts governing slip and 
fall cases and they support Respondent's assertions: 
In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Criner, 380 P. 2d 712 (Okla. 
1963), where plaintiff slipped and fell on a wet floor, the 
Court said at 716: 
"Unless plaintiff introduced sufficient evidence 
to make an issue that plaintiff slipped on floor 
through negligence of defendant's employees, or be-
cause of condition of which defendant had actual 
or constructive notice, in time to remove the cause 
by mopping or by other means which was its duty 
to reasonably do, recovery cannot be here affirmed/' 
The same principle is set out in Little v. Batner, 186 
Kan. 75, 348 P. 2d 1022 (1960), where plaintiff slipped on 
bits of meat dropped on the floor of the store, the Court 
said at 1029: 
"Where the floor has been made dangerous by 
the presence of an obstacle which is traceable to 
persons for whom the proprietor is not responsible, 
absent a condition created by himself, proof that a 
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proprietor was negligent with respect to the floor 
condition requires a showing that he had actual 
\ notice thereof, or that the condition existed for such 
a length of time that in the exercise of reasonable 
care he should have known of it. , , 
A similar principle was followed in Safeway Stores, 
Inc. V. Feeback, 390 P. 2d 519 (Okla. 1964) where plaintiff 
slipped on carrots located on the floor. There the Court 
stated that the produce had been stacked on the vegetable 
counter and there was no evidence as to how the carrots 
came to be on the floor or how long they had been there. 
Starberg V. Olbekson, 129 P. 2d 62 (Ore. 1942) in-
volved a situation where "green vegetable matter" was 
found on the floor and the Court stated : 
"The rule deducible from these authorities is 
that before the proprietor of a store can be held 
liable to a customer for an injury caused by slipping 
on some foreign substance on the floor, the evidence 
must show either that he or his agents placed it 
there or that they knew or, by the exercise of rea-
sonable diligence upon their part, would have known 
that it was there and failed to remove it." 
In Varner V. Kroeger Grocery & Baking Co., 75 S. W. 
2d 585 (1934 Mo.) the Court relied on a standard of or-
dinary care and no negligence was found in the part of the 
proprietor where plaintiff had slipped on a banana peel. 
A similar result was reached in Zerbe V. Springfield, 60 
N. E. 2d 793 (1943 Ohio), and there plaintiff sought to 
establish the period of time the floor was unsafe by the 
condition of the banana. 
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The limited length of time the condition existed was 
an important element in establishing no lack of due care in 
the following cases: Robinson V. Great Atlantic & Pacific 
Tea Co., 347 Mo. 421, 147 S. W. 2d 648 (1941), wherein the 
Court held that "10 to 15 minutes" was not a sufficient 
time to charge the proprietor with notice of a produce box 
in the aisle. Gargaro v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 22 
Tenn. App. 7, 118 S. W. 2d 561, presented facts to the 
Court which caused it to state that "20 to 30 minutes" was 
not sufficient to charge the proprietor with notice of a 
shopping basket in the aisle. R. E. Cox Dry Goods Co. V. 
Kellog, 145 S. W. 2d 675 (Texas 1940), involved a situation 
where plaintiff tripped over sample cases and the Court 
concluded that because the cases constituted a hazard for 
"40 minutes to an hour" was not a sufficient period on 
which to base constructive knowledge. 
Appellant in her brief overlooks the hypothesis that 
absent some showing by competent evidence that the Re-
spondent created the condition of danger or had knowledge 
of the unsafe condition, the hazard must have existed for 
such a period of time as to charge the Respondent with 
notice. In that connection, it is of importance to note that 
in this case there is no evidence as to the time the grape 
had been on the floor. This is a fatal deficiency in proof 
for if the facts support any inference in that regard, it 
would be that the grape was not on the floor when the 
manager proceeded from his office to the checkstand. The 
trial judge so concluded. But pretermitting this conclusion, 
his ruling was right because the Appellant, when given the 
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benefit of all evidence and the reasonable inferences de-
ducible therefrom, falls far short of showing actual knowl-
edge of an unsafe condition of the floor or constructive no-
tice based on the existence of a dangerous condition for a 
substantial period of time. 
CONCLUSION 
In summation, Respondent contends that Appellant 
failed to establish a prima facie case by any evidence that 
Respondent was negligent in any particular. Accordingly, 
she failed to raise a question of fact for jury consideration 
and the trial court did not err in ruling, as a matter of law, 
that the case presented no triable issue and that a verdict 
in favor of Respondent must be directed. 
For the foregoing reasons, it is contended that this 
Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE W. LATIMER, 
and 
ROBERT S. CAMPBELL, JR. 
of 
PARSONS, BEHLE, 
EVANS & LATIMER, 
520 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, 
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent, 
May fair Markets, dba Grand Ameri-
can Markets, nka Arden Farms, Co. 
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